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ABSTRACT 
 
Using predominantly pre-crisis US commercial bank data, this paper employs a propensity 
score matching approach to analyze whether individual banks did improve their 
performance through securitization. On average, our results show that securitizing banks 
tend to be more profitable institutions, with higher credit risk exposure. Despite a more 
diversified funding structure, they face higher funding costs. We also find that securitizing 
banks tend to hold larger and less diversified loan portfolios, have less liquidity, and hold 
less capital. However, our analysis does not provide evidence to suggest that 
securitization had an impact upon bank performance.  
 
 
JEL codes: G21; G32 
Keywords: securitization; bank performance; propensity score matching. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Before the recent financial crisis proponents of securitization, which included the 
banks themselves, as well as investors, regulators, and governments, believed that this 
activity helped improve bank performance. In addition, it was generally perceived that 
securitization promoted a more efficient allocation of risk and a relaxation of constraints on 
credit availability, therefore providing social benefits in addition to private ones. We can 
now see that the securitization trend also led to an increase in systemic risk that 
crystallized with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Since then, several studies have 
investigated the link between securitization and financial instability (BIS 2008, Shin 2009). 
This literature generally concludes that credit risk transfer techniques (CRT) undermine 
financial stability and emphasizes the misalignment of incentives between banks and 
investors in the securitization process.1 A number of other recent papers provide evidence 
to suggest that securitization went hand in hand with a decline in credit standards, 
particularly in relation to the securitization of subprime mortgages (Mian and Sufi 2009, 
Keys et al. 2010, Elul 2011, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 2012). 
Despite the weaknesses in the securitization process revealed by the crisis, policy-
makers as well as market practitioners, acknowledge its potential benefits and are 
currently attempting to revive the market by increasing transparency and by introducing 
changes in terms of simplicity and standardization.2 These new policies aim to ensure that 
securitization remains beneficial and that potential risks do not outweigh potential benefits, 
both at the individual bank level and for the market as a whole. 
We contribute to the ongoing securitization debate by assessing whether individual 
banks had improved their performance through accessing the securitization market in the 
run up to the crisis. Economic theory tells us that, by using securitization, a bank may be 
able to improve its performance through a number of channels, including lower funding 
costs, improved credit risk management, and enhanced profitability.3 While the 
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performance benefits from the originating bank’s perspective can be substantial, in 
practice the key to their realization lies in the quality of the underlying assets, which in turn 
is directly related to the underwriting and credit risk management employed by the banks 
(FDIC 2007). As a result, the net impact of securitization remains ambiguous. It is 
therefore important that we establish at the individual bank level whether securitization 
enhances the performance of securitizing banks. To this end, in this paper we estimate the 
effects of securitization on a number of bank performance indicators, including: (i) cost of 
funding; (ii) credit risk; (iii) profitability; (iv) interest income and expense structure; (v) 
liquidity; (vi) loan portfolio; (vii) capital; and finally (viii) growth.  
An important issue that arises when attempting to estimate the effect of securitization 
on bank performance is that the choice to securitize may be endogenous, that is, banks 
determine whether they want to access the securitization market and when. To address 
self-selection concerns with regard to the endogeneity of the decision to securitize, two 
common approaches have been used in the literature: instrumental variables (IV) and 
Heckman selection estimators. However, both approaches suffer from a number of issues. 
The IV method requires the existence of at least one instrumental variable that determines 
the treatment and is unrelated to unobserved heterogeneity; but the choice of this 
instrument might create potential issues. While the Heckman selection estimator is more 
robust than the instrumental variables estimator, it is more demanding on the assumptions 
about the structure of the model (Blundell and Dias 2000). 
Our empirical design seeks to address self-selection concerns with regard to the 
endogeneity of the securitization decision by applying a propensity score matching 
approach. To our knowledge, this methodology has not been employed in this context in 
the past, and thus represents the key methodological contribution of our paper. 
Specifically, we estimate the securitization effect on the change in the performance of 
banks measured as the difference in outcomes before and after securitization. This is 
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known as a difference-in-differences or double-difference matching strategy, where the 
first difference removes the unobserved heterogeneity and restores conditional 
independence and the second difference produces the impact estimate.  
Our univariate analysis of securitizing and non-securitizing US commercial banks 
between 2001 and 2008 shows that securitizing banks tend to be more profitable 
institutions, have higher credit risk exposure, and have a more diversified funding 
structure. We also find that they have higher funding costs and tend to hold larger and less 
diversified loan portfolios, are less liquid, and hold less capital. However, our propensity 
score matching analysis does not provide evidence to suggest that securitization had an 
impact upon bank performance. For non-securitizing banks that have similar ex-ante 
characteristics to first-time securitizers, we find instead that the use of alternative 
performance-enhancing techniques had a similar impact. Therefore, the results presented 
in this paper show that securitization did not, on average, improve the performance of 
individual banks compared to adequately matched non-securitizing banks. Rather our 
evidence suggests that securitization allowed banks to maintain risky and more profitable 
activities. Finally, our results seem to support previous evidence that in the run up to the 
crisis the risks associated with increasingly complex securitization structures outweighed 
the benefits.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature; Section 3 discusses methodological issues in estimating the effect of 
securitization on bank performance and introduces the propensity score matching 
approach used in this paper; Section 4 presents the data and preliminary univariate 
analysis; Section 5 lays out the implementation of the propensity score matching; Section 6 
presents the results of the propensity score matching analysis; and finally, Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Securitization involves a bank transforming its (usually) illiquid assets, that are 
traditionally held until maturity, into marketable securities by pooling these assets and 
transferring them into a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a bankruptcy-remote entity that in 
turn finances the purchase through the issuance of securities backed by the pool. Between 
the early 1990s and 2008 there was a tremendous increase in the size of securitization 
markets. In the US, the outstanding volume of mortgage-backed securities increased from 
$2.3 trillion in 1994 to $8.4 trillion by the end of 2008, while the market for asset-backed 
securities increased from $192 billion to $2.6 trillion over the same period. In Europe, at 
year-end 2008, the outstanding volume of mortgage-backed securities reached about $2 
trillion (from $26 billion in 1994), while the market for asset-backed securities reached 
$299 billion (from $5 billion in 1994).4 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF 
2009), asset-backed securities and covered bonds provided between 20 per cent and 60 
per cent of the funding for new residential mortgage loans originated in mature economies 
before the credit crisis of 2008. After this extended period of rapid expansion, 
securitization markets froze in late 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The 
impact of the crisis on securitization markets has since been well documented 
(Brunnermeier 2009, Gorton 2010, BIS 2011).  
With the rapid growth in the market for securitized assets, there existed a substantial 
academic literature that focused on both the possible benefits of securitization as well as 
the main drivers and effects of the process.5  Below we briefly review this literature. 
 
2.1 The Economic Benefits of Securitization 
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Early studies of securitization focused on its potential economic benefits. Greenbaum 
and Thakor (1987), Pavel and Phillis (1987), and Hess and Smith (1988) suggest that 
securitization provides a means of reducing risk, of diversifying portfolios, and of funding 
both ongoing operations and the purchase of new assets. Greenbaum and Thakor suggest 
that securitization allows banks to specialize in activities of comparative advantage while 
shifting the activities of comparative disadvantage. Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) argue 
that securitization offers banks a way of lowering their cost of financing. Boot and Thakor 
(1993) show that, in the presence of asymmetric information, pooling assets and issuing 
multiple financial claims with different risk characteristics against the pool cash flow 
enables the issuer to increase its expected revenue. Empirical evidence consistent with 
the profitability-enhancing theory of securitization is found by Bannier and Hänsel (2008) 
and by Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010). 
Flannery (1994), Lockwood, Rutherford, and Herrera (1996), and James (1988) 
consider the role of securitization in mitigating the underinvestment problem of financial 
intermediaries. Lockwood, Rutherford, and Herrera suggest that the cash inflow from the 
issuance of asset-backed securities can be used to retire existing debt, which in turn 
reduces interest expense and increases reported earnings. More recently, Chiesa (2008) 
suggests that optimal credit risk transfer (which can be achieved via securitization) 
reduces the amount of capital that a bank must stake in order for it to be incentive-
compatible to screen and monitor its loans. As a consequence, Chiesa argues that 
securitization can enhance loan monitoring, leading to an increase in the volume of 
financial intermediation and an improvement in welfare.  
 
2.2 The Determinants of Securitization 
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Another branch of the literature focuses on the economic motives that encourage 
banks to securitize. Theory provides us with three main determinants: (i) funding 
requirements; (ii) risk sharing; and (iii) profitability. One fourth theory puts forward the role 
of capital and the potential for regulatory arbitrage because securitization allows banks to 
adjust their regulatory capital ratios. 
Donahoo and Shaffer (1991) suggest that deposit-taking institutions securitize to 
reduce reserve and capital requirements. But Jones (2000) argues that “regulatory capital 
arbitrage” is not the only incentive to engage in securitization and suggests that banks will 
also securitize to benefit from increased economies of scale, to reduce the costs of debt 
financing, and to diversify funding sources. Minton, Sanders, and Strahan (2004) and 
Calomiris and Mason (2004) provide empirical tests of the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis 
against the efficient contracting hypothesis, which suggests that securitization lowers the 
cost of debt finance. The evidence from both studies supports the efficient contracting 
view. In particular, Minton, Sanders, and Strahan find that unregulated finance companies 
and investment banks are more likely to securitize than commercial banks; in addition, 
risky and highly leveraged financial institutions are more likely to engage in securitization 
than safer ones. Bannier and Hänsel (2008) find consistent results using data on 
European banks’ collateralized loan obligation transactions. The authors conclude that the 
securitization market seems to be driven by credit risk management and liquidity raising 
incentives, rather than by regulatory capital arbitrage. Recent work by Panetta and 
Pozzolo (2010) indicates that banks are more likely to securitize when they face lower 
direct and indirect costs. They also find evidence to suggest that banks securitize to 
modify their asset portfolio, allowing them to take up riskier profit opportunities. Using a 
sample of Italian bank data, Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010) analyze the ex-ante 
determinants of securitization and show that less capitalized, less liquid, and less 
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profitable banks with higher levels of non-performing loans are more likely to securitize, 
and in larger amounts. 
 
2.3 The Effects of Securitization 
 
Another strand of research has focused on the effects of securitization on the 
originating banks. Some studies have focused on the quality of assets securitized. Dionne 
and Harchaoui (2003) find evidence to suggest that regulation encouraged banks to hold 
more risky assets and to securitize their lower risk assets. Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and 
Sanders (2005) also found that in response to regulatory capital incentives lenders tended 
to retain riskier loans in their portfolios. However, Carey (1998) shows that the default 
rates on loans retained by the originator were lower than the default rates on the loans 
sold to other investors, which implies that banks tend to retain higher quality loans. 
Similarly, recent studies by Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys et al. (2010), and Dell’Ariccia, Igan, 
and Laeven (2012) find evidence to suggest that US banks securitized their worst 
mortgage loans over the last decade. Calem, Henderson, and Liles (2010) also confirm 
this view with findings of evidence of "cream-skimming" behavior during the subprime 
lending boom. Krainer and Laderman (2011) explore the factors that determine which 
loans are securitized. The results show that the loans chosen by lenders for private-label 
securitizations tend to be riskier than the loans retained in their own portfolios.  
Other researchers have investigated the implicit recourse commonly provided by the 
originating bank and the resulting risk and performance implications for the issuer. 
Calomiris and Mason (2004) and Higgins and Mason (2004) argue that risk remains with 
the securitizing banks as a result of implicit recourse. Chen, Liu, and Ryan (2008) find that 
risk retention by banks varies by type of securitization and is relatively low in the case of 
mortgages, while relatively high for revolving loans such as credit card receivables. 
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Similarly, Vermilyea, Webb, and Kish (2008) find evidence of implicit recourse in credit 
card securitizations. In particular, they show that banks that securitize credit card 
receivables, and banks with poorly performing securitization portfolios, are more likely to 
claim fraud losses on securitized assets which are borne by the originator as opposed to 
credit losses incurred by the owner of the assets, that is, by the SPV. Higgins and Mason 
identify beneficial effects of recourse which arise in the form of increased short- and long-
term stock returns and improved long-term performance. This evidence is consistent with 
that of Gorton and Souleles (2006), who find that market prices of asset-backed securities 
reflect the originator’s ability to provide recourse. Barth, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2012) 
examine whether credit rating agencies and the bond market have a different view of the 
sources of credit risk. They find that while credit rating agencies view securitizations as 
asset sales, bond market participants view securitizations as secured borrowing. 
Finally, some authors have focused on the reinvestment of securitization proceeds. 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) find evidence to suggest that banks use the risk-reducing 
benefits of securitization to engage in more profitable but higher risk activities and to 
operate with greater financial leverage. Purnanandam (2011) also provides evidence to 
suggest that US banks used the proceeds from securitizations to issue loans with higher 
than average default risk. In particular, the author shows that US banks that used credit 
risk transfer techniques to a larger extent before the 2007 subprime crisis had significantly 
higher mortgage charge-offs after the crisis. On the other hand, Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) 
suggest a positive role for mortgage securitization and relate the recent turmoil in 
mortgage credit and securitization markets to recent excesses in those markets. Finally, 
Nadauld and Weisbach (2011) investigate whether securitization-driven demand for 
corporate bank loans had an impact on the cost of corporate debt. Their results indicate 
that yield on a loan that was subsequently securitized was 15 basis points lower, on 
average, than that on an otherwise identical loan that was not securitized, a result that 
11 
 
provides evidence to support the view that securitization led to a reduction in the cost of 
corporate debt. 
Overall, the existing literature has focused on different aspects of the securitization 
process, but has not provided comprehensive evidence of the impact of securitization on 
bank performance. While in theory there may well be benefits of accessing the 
securitization market from the originating bank’s perspective, the empirical evidence to 
date seems to suggest that it went hand in hand with a decline in credit standards. 
Evidence also suggests that banks used the proceeds from securitizations to engage in 
more profitable but higher risk activities and to operate with greater financial leverage. We 
therefore believe that it is important to establish whether securitization enhances the 
performance of securitizing banks at the individual bank level, otherwise in the rush to 
condemn the process of securitization we run the risk of throwing the baby out with the 
bath water. Using US commercial banking data for individual banks from 2001 to 2008, we 
contribute to the existing literature by evaluating the effects of securitization on several 
bank performance indicators, including cost of funding, credit risk, and profitability. In 
addition, the methodology that we apply in this paper augments the existing literature by 
addressing the self-selection concerns with regard to the endogeneity of the decision to 
securitize by applying a propensity score matching approach. We now turn to the empirical 
design of our research. 
 
3 EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
 
In this section, we first discuss the methodological issues in estimating securitization 
effects and then introduce the propensity score matching approach used in this paper to 
address those issues. 
 
3.1 Methodological Issues in Estimating Securitization Effects  
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The analysis of the effect of securitization on bank performance gives rise to several 
methodological issues, particularly, self-selection concerns with regard to the endogeneity 
of the decision to securitize. First, comparing securitizing banks with non-securitizers might 
yield biased estimates of the securitization effect because the performance of non-
securitizers may differ systematically from the performance of securitizers in the absence 
of securitization. Therefore, if securitizers are found to perform better, on average, than 
non-securitizers, the difference may be due to the effect of having accessed the 
securitization market or to differences in banks' characteristics prior to securitization. 
Second, considering only securitizing banks eliminates the possibility of a hypothetical 
benchmark, that is, the performance that banks would have had, had they not securitized. 
Furthermore, the observed change in performance might be due to shocks affecting all 
banks equally.6 
In an attempt to identify the effect of securitization on bank performance, in this paper 
we focus on first-time securitizers. To understand our choice of analysis, consider the 
following three types of bank:  
(i) “securitizers”, that is, banks that have undertaken at least one securitization 
transaction at the beginning of an observation period;  
(ii) “non-securitizers”, that is, banks that do not engage in securitization throughout the 
observation period; and  
(iii) “first-time securitizers”, that is, banks that switch from being non-securitizers to 
being securitizers during the observation period (at time t) by conducting their first 
securitization transaction.  
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical trajectories of average performances of the three 
types of bank and their relative positions. Recall that the proponents of securitization argue 
that, when used responsibly, it should allow banks to improve their performance through a 
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number of channels as discussed earlier. Therefore, securitizing banks are assumed to 
perform better than non-securitizing ones. This is reflected in Figure 1 by drawing the 
performance trajectory of securitizers above the performance trajectory of non-securitizers. 
However, as noted above, this could be because securitizers were better performers prior 
to securitization and/or the consequence of using the securitization market.  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Looking at first-time securitizers might help to disentangle the securitization effect. 
Specifically, if securitization has a positive impact on bank performance, the latter should 
improve once these banks start to securitize. As shown in Figure 1, the performance 
trajectory of first-time securitizers should become steeper and closer to that of securitizers 
after time t.  
To test this hypothesis, we need to know what would have happened to the 
performance of first-time securitizers had they not securitized. Because it is impossible to 
observe the same bank in both states, we need to find an appropriate proxy for the 
counterfactual performance of first-time securitizers. In other words, we need to find a 
proxy for the dotted lines in Figure 1. 
Good candidates for the counterfactual are non-securitizing banks. The performance 
trajectory of the non-securitizers after time t could be considered a proxy for the dotted 
lines. However, this comparison would still entail a selection problem (Heckman and Smith 
1995) - first-time securitizers might be ex-ante different from those that never access the 
securitization market. Specifically, these banks might be either better or worse performers 
at time t-1 compared to non-securitizers, which is reflected by the trajectories “First-Time 
Securitizers A” and “First-Time Securitizers B”, accordingly. 
To overcome this issue and to disentangle the securitization effect, the ex-post 
performance of first-time securitizers (at time t+1) should be compared with that of non-
securitizers that are as similar as possible to the former before any securitization. 
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Therefore, we need to build a control group from the non-securitizers whose performance 
trajectory lies as close as possible to that of the first-time securitizers at time t-1. To 
construct this control group, we apply a propensity score matching approach.  
 
3.2 The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach 
 
Matching has become a popular non-parametric approach for estimating causal 
effects and it is widely used in policy impact analysis. Although it is a relatively new 
technique in the finance literature, this method has been applied in the past to the question 
of diversification (Villalonga 2004), in the context of foreign investment (Barba Navaretti 
and Castellani 2008), and to the decision of firms to go public (Saunders and Steffen 
2011). The idea and methodology can be applied in any study where it is possible to 
identify: (i) a treatment; (ii) a group of treated units; and (iii) a group of non-treated units 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). In this study we apply propensity score matching (PSM) to 
gauge the causal effect of securitization on bank performance, with the first securitization 
considered as the treatment, the first-time securitizers as the group of treated units, and 
the non-securitizers as the group of non-treated units. 
To estimate the causal effect of securitization, we need to know what would have 
happened to the performance of securitizing banks had they not securitized. To do so, let 
itS  be a variable indicating securitization activity and taking a value equal to one if bank i 
conducts a securitization transaction for the first time in period t. Let 1 1 ity  be the 
performance change of bank i at time t+1 after having securitized assets in period t and let 
0
1 ity  be the hypothetical performance change of the same bank i at the same time t+1 
had it not securitized assets in period t (where 111   ititit yyy ). The effect of 
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securitization on the performance of bank i, known in the evaluation literature as the 
average treatment effect on the treated, can be expressed as: 
)1|()1|( 0 11 1   itititit SyESyE        (1) 
In equation (1), )1|( 0 1   itit SyE , which represents the counterfactual mean or the 
hypothetical performance change of a first-time securitizer had it not securitized, is 
unobservable. This constitutes the fundamental problem of causal inference in evaluation 
studies (see Holland 1986). To overcome this problem, we need to find a proxy for this 
counterfactual mean. Using the mean outcome for non-securitizers, that is )0|( 0 1   itit SyE
as a proxy for the counterfactual mean, equation (1) becomes: 
)0|()1|( 0 11 1   itititit SyESyE        (2) 
Unless )0|()1|( 0 10 1   itititit SyESyE , equation (2) is a biased estimator of 
equation (1) because it would yield estimates of the securitization effect plus selection bias 
(Heckman and Smith 1995). Here, the selection bias stems from the unit heterogeneity, or 
the fact that banks might choose endogenously whether to securitize and therefore first-
time securitizers and non-securitizers might be systematically different prior to the 
securitization period t (that is, at time t-1). 
In experimental studies, the selection problem is dealt with by random assignment of 
treatment, which ensures that every individual has the same ex-ante chance of receiving 
treatment (Ravallion 2003). In non-experimental studies, the selection problem is of 
paramount concern because there is no direct estimate of the counterfactual mean 
analogous to the one based on randomization (Dehejia and Wahba 2002, Smith and Todd 
2005). 
A variety of non-experimental estimators allow for the reduction and possible 
elimination of the selection bias in the estimation of average treatment effects under 
different assumptions. Two common approaches are the use of instrumental variables and 
Heckman selection estimators. However, both approaches suffer from a number of 
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issues.7 In this paper we use a matching approach to deal with the selection bias. This is a 
non-parametric approach that enables us to identify the effect of the treatment on the 
outcome under unconfoundedness and common support assumptions (discussed later in 
this section). To apply this approach to the case of securitization, we build a control group 
from non-securitizers that are similar to the first-time securitizers in all relevant pre-
securitization characteristics. Therefore, the causal effect of securitization could be 
presented as: 
),0|(),1|( 10 111 1   itititititit XSyEXSyE                               (3) 
where ),1|( 11 1   ititit XSyE  is the mean performance change of the first-time securitizers 
at time t+1 after securitizing in period t; ),0|( 10 1   ititit XSyE  is the weighted mean 
performance change of the control group at the same time t+1; and 1itX  is a vector of 
conditioning covariates observed at time t-1. 
The implementation of the matching directly on the covariates, or covariate matching, 
might be impractical when the vector of conditioning covariates X  is highly dimensional 
(Zhao 2008). To overcome the “curse of dimensionality”, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
suggest matching on the propensity score, or the probability of assignment to a particular 
treatment conditional on a vector of relevant pre-treatment covariates.8 Using propensity 
score, the equation for the average securitization effect becomes: 
))(,0|())(,1|( 10 111 1   itititititit XpSyEXpSyE            (4)                     
where p  is a propensity score conditional on 1itX . In other words, the average 
securitization effect is estimated as the difference between the mean performance change 
of the first-time securitizers after their first securitization and that of the banks that had ex-
ante similar likelihood of securitizing but did not. 
For consistent estimates of the securitization effect, two key assumptions must hold: 
the unconfoundedness assumption and the common support assumption. The 
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unconfoundedness assumption, also referred to as the “conditional independence 
assumption” or “selection on observables”, requires the mean outcomes to be independent 
of the treatment after conditioning on a set of observable covariates (Imbens 2004, Smith 
and Todd 2005) and can be formally stated as:9 
1
1
1
0
1 |),(   itititit XSyy  or )(|),( 11 10 1   itititit XpSyy                          (5) 
In other words, it assumes that there are no unobservable differences between first-
time securitizers and non-securitizers after conditioning on 1itX , so that any systematic 
differences in outcomes can be attributed to the securitization effect.  
The unconfoundedness thus assumes away the potential bias arising from the 
selection on observables (Sianesi 2004).10 To link the unconfoundedness assumption with 
standard exogeneity assumptions, it could be written as:  
iiii XSy   '          (6) 
Here, the unconfoundedness is equivalent to the independence of iS  and i  
conditional on iX  which would also capture the idea that iS  is exogenous (Imbens 2004). 
This is a strong assumption because, even after conditioning on the observable covariates 
included in X , there may be systematic differences between the first-time securitizers’ and 
non-securitizers’ outcomes (Smith and Todd 2005).11 Such discrepancies may arise, for 
example, because first-time securitizers and non-securitizers may operate in regions that 
may have a differential impact on performance. Therefore, in this paper we estimate the 
securitization effect on the change in the performance of banks measured as the 
difference in outcomes before and after securitization. This is known as a difference-in-
differences or double-difference matching strategy, where the first difference removes the 
unobserved heterogeneity and restores conditional independence and the second 
difference produces the impact estimate (Essama-Nssah 2006).12 The assumptions 
required to justify the difference-in-differences matching estimator are weaker than those 
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required to justify simple matching; moreover, the difference-in-differences matching 
estimator is suggested to be the most robust (Heckman et al. 1998, Smith and Todd 
2005).  
Next, the common support, or overlap assumption requires an overlap in the 
distribution of covariates between the treated and control units to make matching possible 
(Imbens 2004) and can be formally stated as: 
1)|1Pr(0 1  itit XS                   (7) 
This assumption imposes a positive probability of either securitizing ( 1itS ) or not 
securitizing ( 0itS ), to ensure the existence of potential matches for each first-time 
securitizer among non-securitizers.13  
When the unconfoundedness and common support assumptions are satisfied, the 
mean outcome observed for the matched non-treated group can be substituted for the 
missing counterfactual mean for the treated units (Smith and Todd 2005). In other words, if 
the two assumptions hold, we can estimate the casual effect of securitization using the 
mean outcome for the matched non-securitizers as a proxy for the performance change 
that the first-time securitizers would have had had they not securitized, that is, 
)1|( 0 1   itit SyE  in equation (1). 
This matching approach thus provides a means of dealing with the selection problem 
and a means of estimating causal treatment effects in a non-experimental context using 
observational data. The most attractive feature of the matching approach is its non-
parametric nature, that is, it does not impose functional form restrictions in estimating the 
conditional expectation of the outcome variable and it leaves the individual causal effect 
unrestricted and hence allows arbitrary heterogeneity of the effects in the sample (Lechner 
2002, Smith and Todd 2005, Zhao 2008).  
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4 DATA AND PRELIMINARY UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
The data for this paper were obtained from the Federal Reserve’s Reports of 
Condition and Income (Call Reports) that are filed by insured commercial banks on a 
quarterly basis and contain the complete balance sheet, income statement, and detailed 
supporting schedules, including a schedule of off-balance-sheet items. Starting from June 
2001, US banks were required to provide detailed information on securitization activities in 
their regulatory forms.14 Given the incorporation of the new data into the reporting forms, 
we use Call Reports from the second quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2008. When 
constructing the data set, we first exclude banks with missing information on total assets, 
liquidity, loans, deposits, capital, income, and securitization activities for any quarter of the 
sample period. We then keep banks with at least 5 consecutive quarters of data and define 
a bank as a securitizer if there is an outstanding securitization in at least one quarter. To 
prevent the possibility of outliers driving the results, we winsorize all quarterly ratio 
variables at the 1% level.15 Finally, we average the quarterly data on a yearly basis to build 
a data set of annual observations.16 
As a preliminary step to the PSM analysis, we begin with a cross-sectional analysis 
of the full sample and compare the characteristics of banks that securitize with those that 
do not. First-time securitizers are included in the group of securitizers because we analyze 
the differences between banks that never securitize and those that securitize at least once 
throughout the sample period.17 The results of the comparisons are reported in Table 1. 
There are 9,182 banks in the sample, of which 432 are securitizers and 8,750 are non-
securitizers. Despite their smaller number (4.7% of the sample), securitizers still account 
for nearly 67% of the sample by total assets.18  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
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Panel A of Table 1 presents a summary of the balance sheet information of the 
banks in our sample. We find that the most significant difference is bank size, with the 
mean value of total assets for securitizers ($15.6 billion) being approximately 40 times 
larger than that for non-securitizers ($0.4 billion). This finding is consistent with previous 
research that finds that larger banks are more likely to securitize (Minton, Sanders, and 
Strahan 2004, Uzun and Webb 2007, Bannier and Hänsel 2008, Jiangli and Pritsker 2008, 
Minton, Stulz, and Williamson 2009). Further, securitizers tend to hold less liquid assets 
(25% of total assets versus 27% for non-securitizers), which is consistent with them having 
better access to external funding and thus needing a smaller liquidity buffer compared to 
non-securitizers. While being relatively small, the trading asset ratio appears higher for 
securitizers. Both the loan ratio and the loan to deposit ratio are higher for securitizers 
(66% versus 64% for non-securitizers and 88% versus 79% for non-securitizers, 
respectively); this might reflect securitizers’ reduced access to core deposits (which in turn 
might have forced them to securitize). It might also reflect their choice of funding because 
securitizing institutions are larger and might have a preference for accessing 
wholesale/interbank funds rather than relying on retail deposits. 
Looking at the liability side of the balance sheet, we find that both securitizers and 
non-securitizers are mainly financed by deposits; however, securitizers rely on this source 
of funding to a smaller extent (76% of total assets versus 82% for non-securitizers). 
Further, 10.6% of total assets is funded by equity capital for securitizers compared with 
11.4% for non-securitizers. This could reflect both the effect of securitization and/or a size 
effect where securitizers (which are on average larger banks) might tend to hold less 
capital. Interestingly, the data show that loan growth is lower for securitizers compared 
with non-securitizers (12% versus 15%); however, there appears to be no statistically 
significant difference between securitizers and non-securitizers in terms of asset growth 
(around 12% in both samples). 
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Table 1 also contains information on banks’ loan portfolios (Panel B). Securitizers’ 
loan portfolios differ in terms of both diversification and composition. In particular, they 
tend to be less diversified, as indicated by the mean value of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of 0.59 versus 0.56 for non-securitizers, with real estate loans constituting 
more than 60% of total loans in both samples. Despite the similar relative distribution, 
there are differences in terms of the loan share values between securitizers and non-
securitizers. Specifically, securitizers tend to hold less agricultural loans (4% versus 7% for 
non-securitizers) and more consumer (11% versus 9% for non-securitizers) and other 
loans (3% versus 2% for non-securitizers) on the balance sheet; while securitizers appear 
to hold less real estate and commercial and industrial loans (64% versus 66% for non-
securitizers and 15% versus 16% for non-securitizers, respectively), the differences are 
not statistically significant.19 
Comparing the regulatory capital (Table 1, Panel C), we find that securitizers have 
significantly less capital than non-securitizers on a risk-adjusted basis; nonetheless, they 
are overcapitalized in terms of regulatory requirements. For example, the mean total risk-
based capital ratio for securitizers is 15% (compared with 18% for non-securitizers). 
Securitizers also have lower Tier 1 leverage and Tier 1 risk-based capital ratios (10% 
versus 11% for non-securitizers and 14% versus 17% for non-securitizers, respectively). 
This finding is consistent with Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) who find that banks that sell 
loans hold less capital. Similarly, Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2009) find evidence to 
suggest that risk-adjusted capital ratios are lower for the net buyers of credit protection. 
We next compare the risk profiles of securitizers and non-securitizers using a number 
of risk measures (Table 1, Panel D): (i) risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio; (ii) non-
performing loan ratio; (iii) charge-off ratio; (iv) allowance ratio; (v) provision ratio; and (vi) 
time deposit premium. The latter measured as the interest rate spread between uninsured 
large time deposits (>=$100,000) and insured small time deposits (<$100,000) should be 
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greater for a riskier bank because uninsured depositors would require a higher rate to 
deposit money with the bank (Jiangli and Pritsker 2008). We find that securitizers are more 
risky in all the measures considered with the differences being statistically significant. 
Similar results are found by Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) and Minton, Stulz and Williamson 
(2009) with provision, charge-off, and non-performing loan ratios higher for securitizers. 
Jiangli and Pritsker suggest that this could reflect securitization and/or size effects in 
allowing banks to extend loans with higher expected losses. 
For the cost of funding (Table 1, Panel E), we consider the cost of (i) total liabilities, 
(ii) total deposits, (iii) small time deposits, and (iv) large time deposits. We find that the 
cost of total liabilities is higher for securitizers, while the difference in the cost of deposits 
appears insignificant; this suggests that securitizing banks rely more heavily on non-
deposit funding and pay a higher cost for this source of funding. 
We next turn to the indicators of operating performance (Table 1, Panel F). The data 
show that securitizers are more profitable in terms of both return on equity and return on 
assets (11% versus 9% for non-securitizers and 1% versus 0.8% for non-securitizers, 
respectively). The net interest margin is, however, found to be lower for securitizers (3.6% 
versus 3.8% for non-securitizers); this suggests that the higher profitability of securitizers 
derives from non-interest income. The latter also constitutes a greater part of net operating 
revenue for securitizers (25% compared with 16% for non-securitizers), which is consistent 
with securitizers having an additional source of income in the form of servicing fees and 
possibly more revenue from trading activities.20  
Finally, in panels G and H respectively of Table 1, we consider the structure of 
interest income and interest expense. We find that securitizers have less income from 
balances due from depository institutions and from federal funds sold and securities 
purchased under agreements to resell (REPO) (0.7% versus 0.8% for non-securitizers and 
1.5% versus 2.3% for non-securitizers, accordingly), while more other interest income 
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(0.6% versus 0.4% for non-securitizers). As for the interest expense, we find that 
securitizers have significantly lower expense on deposits (81% versus 90% for non-
securitizers); this is probably driven by the lower deposit ratio given that the data show no 
significant difference in the cost of deposits between securitizers and non-securitizers. 
Further, securitizers have greater expense associated with funding raised in the form of 
federal funds and securities sold under agreements to repurchase (REPO) (4.4% versus 
1.8% for non-securitizers), trading liabilities and other borrowed money (13.7% versus 
7.5% for non-securitizers), and subordinated notes and debentures (0.7% versus 0.1% for 
non-securitizers). Overall, the data show more significant differences between securitizers 
and non-securitizers in terms of the structure of interest expense rather than interest 
income. 
 Taken together, the comparisons suggest that securitizers appear to be more 
profitable, although they extend riskier loans while paying a higher cost of funds for the 
excessive risk taking. Securitizing banks also hold less liquidity, larger and less diversified 
loan portfolios, and less equity capital. They also diversify their funding to a greater extent 
through repurchase agreements, trading liabilities, and subordinated debt, and increase 
their non-interest income through fees and trading revenues. 
 
5 PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 First-Time Securitizers and Non-Securitizers 
To determine the impact of securitization on bank performance, we focus on two 
groups of banks: first-time securitizers and non-securitizers. Given that securitization is a 
recurring activity, we focus on the first observed transaction to build the sub-sample of 
first-time securitizers from the sample of securitizing banks.21 We do not use the first-time 
securitizers of 2001 and 2008 because for these cases we are not able to collect pre- and 
post-securitization information. Therefore, the treatment group for the propensity score 
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matching analysis consists of banks that conduct their first securitization in any year from 
2002 to 2007. The control group is built from banks that do not securitize over the 2001-
2008 period, that is, the sample of non-securitizers used in the univariate analysis in 
section 4. This gives 197 first-time securitizers and 46,375 bank-years in the control group 
of non-securitizers over the period from 2002 to 2007. Panel A of Table 2 reports the 
statistics on the final unmatched sample by year, which shows that the number of first-time 
securitizers in this unmatched sample is fairly evenly dispersed across the six years.22 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Table 3 reports the statistics for the 197 first securitizations in the unmatched sample 
by the type of underlying assets, that is: (i) mortgages; (ii) home equity lines; (iii) credit 
card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) commercial and industrial 
loans; and (viii) all other loans, all leases, and all other assets. The statistics include the 
number of first securitizations and the amount of securitized assets relative to total assets 
for each asset type.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
The data show that of the 197 first securitizations, 135 transactions include 
mortgages, of which 8 combine mortgages with other assets and 127 include mortgages 
only. The next largest groups are: securitizations of all other loans, all leases, and all other 
assets (27 transactions), commercial and industrial loans (22 transactions), and credit card 
receivables (11 transactions). While most of the asset classes appear to be combined in a 
number of first securitizations, credit card receivables are not. This could be explained by 
the revolving nature of credit card receivables, which therefore entails a different 
securitization structure. The mean size of transactions varies from 1.5% of total assets for 
other consumer loan securitizations to around 7% of total assets for auto and commercial 
and industrial loan securitizations. Interestingly, the largest securitization transaction as a 
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proportion of total assets was comprised of commercial and industrial loans (47%) 
followed by one comprising of mortgages (42%). 
 
5.2 Implementation of the Propensity Score Matching  
 
The implementation of the propensity score matching approach can be broken down 
into three steps: (i) estimating propensity scores for first-time securitizers and non-
securitizers; (ii) matching first-time securitizers with non-securitizers; and finally, (iii) 
estimating average securitization effects.  
To estimate the propensity scores, we use a probit regression of a dummy variable 
that has a unit value for the first securitization, and zero otherwise.23 According to the 
matching literature, the regressors included in the model should reflect both the 
institutional settings of banks and the theoretical and empirical background on the 
determinants of banks’ decision to securitize. It is also worth noting that the main purpose 
of the propensity score estimation is not to predict the treatment, but to balance all the 
covariates between the two groups (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). To do so, we define six 
sets of bank-specific variables. The first set reflects general characteristics of bank 
balance sheet and income structure. From the asset side, we include measures of bank 
liquidity, loan portfolio size and composition. The latter is captured in terms of both the 
breakdown of loans into five major categories (real estate, commercial and industrial, 
agricultural, consumer, and other loans)24 and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
calculated using the five loan shares. From the liability side, we include deposit and capital 
ratios. We also include bank size, measured as the logarithm of total assets.25 Finally, we 
capture the income structure using the non-interest income to net operating revenue ratio.  
Next we include sets of variables that proxy for most of the commonly cited motives 
for securitization: funding cost reduction; credit risk management; profitability 
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improvement; regulatory capital relief; and liquidity needs. The funding cost reduction 
hypothesis is captured by the cost of total liabilities. To reflect the credit risk management 
hypothesis, we use the non-performing loan ratio (Calomiris and Mason 2004, Jiangli and 
Pritsker 2008, Minton, Stulz, and Williamson 2009, Affinito and Tagliaferri 2010, Cardone-
Riportella, Samaniego-Medina, and Trujillo-Ponce 2010). We capture bank profitability 
using return on equity (Minton, Sanders, and Strahan 2004, Bannier and Hänsel 2008, 
Minton, Stulz, and Williamson 2009). With respect to the regulatory capital relief 
hypothesis, we include the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (Calomiris and Mason 2004, 
Uzun and Webb 2007, Bannier and Hänsel 2008, Minton, Stulz, and Williamson 2009). 
Finally, we capture liquidity needs using the loan growth (Affinito and Tagliaferri 2010). We 
also indirectly capture other possible motives for securitization through the variables 
included in the balance sheet and income structure set. Specifically, the loan HHI captures 
the portfolio diversification motive; the non-interest income to net operating revenue ratio 
captures the banking activity diversification motive (Affinito and Tagliaferri 2010); and 
finally, bank size captures the possible influence of economies of scale (Uzun and Webb 
2007, Bannier and Hänsel 2008, Jiangli and Pritsker 2008, Minton, Stulz, and Williamson 
2009, Affinito and Tagliaferri 2010, Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina, and Trujillo-
Ponce 2010, Panetta and Pozzolo 2010). 
One of the required conditions in the propensity score matching analysis is that the 
variables included in the propensity score model should not be affected by the treatment 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). To this end, the bank-specific variables employed in our 
model are lagged by one year: 
),,|1( 11 iititit StZXSP           (8) 
where itS  is a first-securitization dummy, 1itX  is a vector of general balance sheet 
characteristics, 1itZ  is a vector of variables capturing the five main hypotheses on the 
motivation for securitization, and iSt  are state dummies.26  
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We estimate the propensity scores for the 197 first-time securitizers and 46,357 
bank-years of non-securitizers reported in Panel A of Table 2, estimating the model year 
by year. For reporting reasons, we reproduce a pooled probit regression for the period 
from 2002 to 2007 as it yields qualitatively similar results. To control for dependence of 
standard errors for a given bank, we cluster the standard errors at the bank level. The 
estimates of the pooled regression are reported in Table 4.   
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
The results provide significant evidence for the economies of scale, banking activity 
diversification, and liquidity needs hypotheses. Specifically, we find that a bank is more 
likely to securitize if it has a larger size, a higher share of non-interest income in the net 
operating revenue, and high liquidity needs reflected in a higher loan growth. These results 
are consistent with previous studies on banks’ propensity to securitize. 
Having estimated the propensity scores, we proceed to match first-time securitizers 
with non-securitizers. We employ nearest-neighbor matching where the unit chosen from 
the non-securitizers (that is, unit j from the control group) as a match for the first-time 
securitizer (that is, unit i from the treatment group) is the one closest in terms of the 
propensity score: 27 
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ji pppp            (9) 
 To avoid the risk of bad matches entailed in this approach, we impose a 1% 
tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance allowed, the so called caliper.28 
We run nearest-neighbor matching year by year to ensure that each first-time securitizer is 
matched with an observation from the non-securitizer group of the same year the first 
securitization occurs. The empirical setting requires us to restrict the initial unmatched 
sample of first-time securitizers and non-securitizers to those with data from one year 
before and to two years after the first-securitization year.29 Further, we impose the 
common support, or overlap condition, discussed earlier, by prohibiting the perfect 
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predictability of first securitization given the observed covariates to ensure the existence of 
potential matches in the non-securitizers group.30 This leaves us with 168 first-time 
securitizers and their 168 non-securitizing controls in the matched sample. This is the 
sample used for the estimation of the average securitization effects. Panel B of Table 2 
reports the number of completed matches by year. 
To verify the quality of matching, we plot the distribution of the propensity score for 
the first-time securitizers and non-securitizers before and after matching (Figure 2). In the 
unmatched sample the propensity score distribution of the non-securitizers is skewed to 
the left, whereas it is very close to that of the first-time securitizers in the matched sample.  
This result suggests that the matches are appropriate. 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
Further, since matching is conditioned on the propensity score rather than on all 
covariates, we check whether the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of 
all the relevant variables in both the control and treatment groups (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2008). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest a two-sample t-test for comparing the 
distributions of the covariates in the treated and matched control groups. To this end, we 
compare the first-time securitizers and non-securitizers before and after matching and 
check if there remain any significant differences in the balancing covariates after 
conditioning on the propensity score. The results of the tests are reported in Table 5. We 
find significant differences before matching, whereas in the matched sample the covariates 
are balanced in both groups suggesting successful matching. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
6 SECURITIZATION EFFECT ON BANK PERFORMANCE: RESULTS 
 
6.1 Main Results 
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We now use the matched sample to estimate the effects of securitization on the 
following indicators of bank performance: (i) cost of funding (cost of total liabilities and total 
deposits); (ii) credit risk (non-performing loan and charge-off ratios); (iii) profitability (return 
on assets and equity); (iv) interest income and expense structure (interest income and 
interest expense HHIs); (v) liquidity (liquidity and loan to deposit ratios); (vi) loan portfolio 
(loan ratio and loan HHI); (vii) capital (equity and Tier 1 risk-based capital ratios); and 
finally, (viii) growth (loan and asset growth). To do so, we first pool the yearly matched 
first-time securitizers and non-securitizers. Second, we calculate the changes in the 
performance indicators over a two-year window around the first-securitization year (that is, 
111   ititit yyy ) for each indicator. Finally, we estimate the average securitization 
effects as differences in the mean changes in the performance indicators between the first-
time securitizers and non-securitizers.  
We run the analysis for the full 2002-2007 sample with 336 banks in total. The results 
are reported in Panel A of Table 6. The estimates of the average securitization effects are 
presented as “∆” with statistical significance in parentheses, where the latter is calculated 
based on bootstrapped standard errors. The interpretation of the estimates is as follows. If 
∆ is different from zero, the change in the performance indicator over the time window for 
the first-time securitizers is different from that for the matched non-securitizers. For 
example, a positive ∆ for profitability would suggest a larger rise, a smaller drop, or a rise 
versus a drop in the profitability for the first-time securitizers compared to the matched 
non-securitizers, which in turn would suggest a positive effect of securitization on 
profitability. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
In what follows, we discuss the key differences between the two samples. We find a 
larger drop in the cost of total liabilities and total deposits for first-time securitizers, which 
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suggests a positive impact of securitization on the cost of funding. As for credit risk, 
securitization seems to result in a smaller rise in the non-performing loan ratio but a higher 
rise in the charge-off ratio. While the data show a reduction in both return on equity and 
return on assets for both samples, the reduction is larger for first-time securitizers thus 
suggesting a negative impact of securitization on bank profitability, in the short term at 
least. Both samples exhibit an increase in interest income concentration; however, first-
time securitizers experience a smaller rise compared with non-securitizers. Looking at the 
interest expense structure, while both samples experience a decrease in concentration, 
the drop is smaller for first-time securitizers.  
Turning to indicators of bank liquidity, we find a larger drop in the liquidity ratio for the 
first-time securitizers; the result is reversed for the loan to deposit ratio with first-time 
securitizers exhibiting a smaller rise. While both samples exhibit an increase in loan 
portfolio size and concentration, first-time securitizers’ portfolio size and concentration 
increase to a lesser extent than those for matched non-securitizers.  
The analysis of the impact of accessing the securitization market on bank capital 
produces mixed results: while first-time securitizers experience a smaller fall in equity 
capital, their Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio falls more compared with non-securitizers. 
Finally, we estimate a larger drop in both loan and asset growth for first-time securitizers.  
The results of the analysis highlight some differences between first-time securitizers 
and non-securitizers; however, it is important to emphasize that none of the estimates are 
statistically different from zero. In other words, overall the results suggest that the first-time 
securitizers would have had comparable performance in the one year after first securitizing 
had they not securitized. 
 
6.2 Three-Year Window 
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To test whether securitization takes effect over a longer period, we analyze a three-
year window. To do so, we calculate the changes in the performance indicators as 
122   ititit yyy . As with the two-year window, we then estimate the average 
securitization effects as differences in the mean changes in the performance indicators 
between the first-time securitizers and non-securitizers. We have to exclude from our 
sample 40 banks that securitized for the first time in 2007 because the t+2 data are not 
available for these banks. This leaves 128 first-time securitizers and their 128 non-
securitizing controls for the estimation. 
The results of the three-year window analysis are reported in Panel B of Table 6. 
While for some performance indicators the estimates of the average securitization effect 
differ slightly from the two-year window results in terms of the magnitude, overall the signs 
and statistical significance of the estimates remain unchanged. In other words, consistent 
with the two-year window results, we find no evidence of a significant effect on bank 
performance of securitization over the longer three-year period.    
 
6.3 Robustness Tests: Alternative Performance Measures 
 
To validate our main results, we consider alternative measures for the performance 
indicators examined in the main part of the analysis. Specifically, for the cost of funding we 
use the cost of small and large time deposits. As alternative measures of credit risk, we 
consider the provision ratio and the time deposit premium. For profitability, we use the net 
interest margin, cost to income and non-interest income to net operating revenue ratios. 
We also break down the interest income and expense into the main categories. We 
consider the loan portfolio in terms of five major types of loans. Finally, we use Tier 1 
leverage and total risk-based capital ratios as alternatives measures of capital.  
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We estimate securitization effects on the alternative performance measures using 
both two- and three-year windows. The results are reported in Table 7. Overall, we find 
that the evidence is consistent with the main finding of no significant effect of securitization 
on bank performance, apart from that on the consumer loan ratio where we find a larger 
drop for first-time securitizers over the two-year window. This might be a consequence of 
accessing the securitization market. For the three-year window the result for the consumer 
loan ratio is similar, although, the estimate is not statistically significant.  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
Overall, we find no evidence that securitizing for the first time had a significant impact 
on the performance of banks, that is, first-time securitizers would have had comparable 
performance had they not securitized. Referring to Figure 1, the evidence suggests the 
performance trajectories of first-time securitizers (that is, First-Time Securitizers A and 
First-Time Securitizers B) might change the trend marginally after first securitization at 
time t, but remain close to the hypothetical trajectories presented by the dotted lines. 
The finding of no significant impact of securitization on bank performance may be 
driven by a number of factors that might mitigate potential benefits of securitization, 
including: (i) the quality of assets securitized and of those retained on the balance sheet, 
which in turn might be driven by regulatory capital arbitrage and earnings management 
motives (Dionne and Harchaoui 2003, Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Sanders 2005, 
Karaoglu 2005, Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare 2010); (ii) contractual and non-
contractual credit enhancements, which might result in the originating bank retaining 
significant interests in the securitized asset pool (Niu and Richardson 2006, Landsman, 
Peasnell, and Shakespeare 2008, Casu and Sarkisyan 2012); and (iii) post-securitization 
lending behavior in terms of both risk taking and the volume of credit supply (Cebenoyan 
and Strahan 2004, Loutskina and Strahan 2009, Panetta and Pozzolo 2010, Purnanandam 
2011). 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we conduct an analysis of the effect of accessing the securitization 
market on bank performance. The theoretical predictions are that securitizing banks 
should have better performance because securitization should enable them to lower the 
cost of funding, to improve credit risk and capital management, and to increase 
profitability, both via income and portfolio diversification. Using US commercial bank data 
from 2001 to 2008, our univariate analysis reveals that securitizing banks do tend to be 
more profitable institutions, with a more diversified funding structure, but with higher 
funding costs, and with higher credit risk exposure. They also tend to hold larger and less 
diversified loan portfolios, have less liquidity, hold less capital, and appear to have lower 
loan growth compared with non-securitizing banks.  
In an effort to understand better the impact of securitization on bank performance, we 
attempt to determine what would have happened to securitizing banks had they not 
securitized their assets. In other words, we try to identify the counterfactual performance. 
We do this by using propensity score matching (PSM) which allows us to estimate the 
effect of securitization by comparing the performance of first-time securitizers with that of 
banks that had, ex-ante, a similar securitization likelihood but which chose not to 
securitize. Using PSM, we estimate the effects of securitization on a number of bank 
performance indicators, including: (i) cost of funding; (ii) credit risk; (iii) profitability; (iv) 
interest income and expense structure; (v) liquidity; (vi) loan portfolio; (vii) capital; and 
finally, (viii) growth.  
We find no evidence that securitization had significant effects on the performance 
indicators considered; that is, the results suggest that one and two years after a bank’s 
first securitization, it would have had comparable performance had it not securitized. In 
other words, we find that securitization does not seem to outperform significantly 
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alternative performance-enhancing techniques used by adequately matched non-
securitizing banks.  
The absence in our findings of a significant impact of securitization on banks’ 
performance may be partially driven by the underwriting and credit management 
techniques employed by securitizing banks – when performed poorly, these may 
undermine the potential performance benefits of accessing the securitization market. 
Specifically, while securitization may allow banks to raise funds at a lower cost, non-
performing underlying assets may impair the banks’ access to the market and require 
higher credit risk enhancements, thereby considerably increasing the cost of this funding 
source. In addition, while securitization may allow banks to reduce credit risk exposure by 
transferring the unexpected portion of the default risk to credit-enhancers and outside 
investors, management’s incentives to ensure the performance of the securitized pool – 
and, thereby, establish and maintain a bank's reputation in the market - may result in 
“cherry-picking” of assets when designing the securitization transaction and in providing 
implicit and/or explicit recourse to the structure. This might be particularly important when 
banks access the securitization market for the first time. As a consequence, in the short 
term, the potential benefits to banks in terms of reduced cost of funding and reduced credit 
risk might be outweighed by the implicit and explicit costs of structuring the transaction. In 
the longer term, there is evidence in the literature that securitization may also trigger lax 
origination and monitoring processes. This could eventually offset the potential credit risk 
reduction achieved through securitization. Finally, the additional capital released through 
securitization can be used by banks for expansion purposes or to retire existing debt, 
which in turn might increase profitability. However, poor underwriting and credit risk 
management practices might offset the potential positive effect on profitability. Additionally, 
the effect on profitability of securitization may be distorted by managers' discretion 
afforded under fair value accounting rules. 
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Our research contributes to the literature by assessing the effects of securitization on 
a wide range of bank performance indicators. Overall, the results seem to suggest that the 
securitization model used by banks undermined the potential benefits offered by the 
market and therefore raise important questions about the motives for banks’ increasing 
securitization activities over the past decade. This behaviour was possibly allowed in part 
by the increased complexity of transactions along with a lack of transparency in the market 
which may have been exacerbated by lenient regulation and supervision. Our results 
therefore support the on-going debate about the need to improve the regulation and 
supervision of securitization activities to bring more standardization and transparency into 
the market, with the aim to ensure that potential risks do not outweigh potential benefits of 
banks’ engagement in securitization. Taken together, these regulatory changes will 
hopefully encourage banks to undertake more responsible securitizations in the future and, 
simultaneously, give investors more information on risks inherent in securitization needed 
to revive the market. 
Our study also highlights the need for further research into the inherent risks of the 
securitization process, including those that emanate from the structure of transactions, 
implicit recourse, regulatory arbitrage, and earnings management; as well as the potential 
for these risks to impact on bank performance. In addition, while our analysis provides 
valuable findings on the securitization behaviour of US banks, the impact of securitization 
might be heterogeneous across different countries due to existing differences in 
accounting standards and/or regulatory practices. Therefore, further research is also 
needed to assess the impact of securitization on the performance of EU and other non-US 
banks in the run up to the crisis. Such research could potentially contribute to the 
continuing regulatory debate and to the search for a consensus in accounting standards 
for securitization activities across international markets. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1 Variable Names and Construction 
Variable Definition Construction (Call Report items) 
Balance sheet structure   
Total assets Total assets RCFD2170 
Size Logarithm(total assets) LN(RCFD2170) 
Liquidity ratio (Cash + securities)/total assets (RCFD0081 + RCFD0071 + RCFD1754 + 
RCFD1773)/RCFD2170 
Trading asset ratio Trading assets/total assets RCFD3545/RCFD2170 
Loan ratio Total loans/total assets RCFD1400/RCFD2170 
Loans/deposits Total loans/total deposits RCFD1400/RCFD2200 
Deposit ratio Total deposits/total assets RCFD2200/RCFD2170 
Capital ratio Total equity capital/total assets RCFD3210/RCFD2170 
Loan growth Loan growth rate  
Asset growth Asset growth rate  
Loan portfolio   
Real estate loan ratio Real estate loans/total loans RCFD1410/RCFD1400 
Commercial and industrial loan 
ratio  
Commercial and industrial loans/total 
loans 
RCFD1766/RCFD1400 
Agricultural loan ratio Agricultural loans/total loans RCFD1590/RCFD1400 
Consumer loan ratio Consumer loans/total loans RCFD1975/RCFD1400 
Other loan ratio Other loans/total loans (RCFD1400 - RCFD1410 - RCFD1766 - RCFD1590 - 
RCFD1975)/RCFD1400 
Loan HHI Loan Herfindahl-Hirschman index (RCFD1410/RCFD1400)
2
 + (RCFD1766/RCFD1400)
2
+ (RCFD1590/RCFD1400)
 2
 + 
RCFD1975/RCFD1400)
 2
 + ((RCFD1400 - RCFD1410 
- RCFD1766 - RCFD1590 - RCFD1975)/RCFD1400)
2
 
Regulatory capital   
Tier 1 leverage ratio Tier 1 leverage ratio RCFD7204  
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio RCFD7206 
Total risk-based capital ratio Total risk-based capital ratio RCFD7205 
Risk measures   
RWATA  ratio Risk-weighted assets/total assets RCFDA223/RCFD2170 
NPL ratio Non-performing loans/total loans (RCFD1407 + RCFD1403)/RCFD1400 
Charge-off ratio Net charge-offs/total loans RIAD4635/RCFD1400 
Allowance ratio Allowance for loan losses/total loans RCFD3123/RCFD1400 
Provision ratio Provision for loan losses/total loans RIAD4230/RCFD1400 
Time deposit premium Interest rate on large time deposits – 
interest rate on small time deposits 
RIADA517/RCONA514 - RIADA518/RCONA529 
Cost of funding   
Total liabilities Total interest expense/total liabilities RIAD4073/RCFD2948 
Total deposits Interest expense on total deposits/total 
deposits 
(RIAD4508 + RIAD0093 + RIADA517 + RIADA518 + 
RIAD4172)/RCFD2200 
Small time deposits Interest expense on small time deposits/ 
small time deposits (<$100,000) 
RIADA518/RCONA529 
Large time deposits Interest expense on large time deposits/ 
large time deposits (>=$100,000) 
RIADA517/RCONA514 
  (continued on next page) 
 Note: Variables used in study. Commercial bank data items are taken from Federal Reserve’s Reports of Condition and Income 
(Call Reports). 
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Table A1 Continued 
Variable Definition Construction (Call Report items) 
Operating performance   
Return on equity Net income/total equity capital RIAD4340/RCFD3210 
Return on assets Net income/total assets RIAD4340/RCFD2170 
Net interest margin Net interest income/total assets RIAD4074/RCFD2170 
Cost/income Total non-interest expense/net operating 
revenue 
RIAD4093/(RIAD4074 + RIAD4079) 
Revenue HHI  Revenue Herfindahl-Hirschman index (RIAD4074/(RIAD4074 + RIAD4079))
 2
 + 
(RIAD4079/(RIAD4074 + RIAD4079))
 2
 
Non-interest income/net 
operating revenue 
Non-interest income/net operating 
revenue 
RIAD4079/(RIAD4074 + RIAD4079) 
Interest income   
Loans Interest income on loans/total interest 
income 
(RIAD4010 + RIAD4065)/RIAD4107 
Depositary institutions Interest income on balances due from 
depository institutions/total interest 
income 
RIAD4115/RIAD4107 
Securities Interest and dividend income on 
securities/total interest income 
(RIADB488 + RIADB489 + RIAD4060)/RIAD4107 
Trading assets Interest income from trading assets/total 
interest income 
RIAD4069/RIAD4107 
REPO Interest income on federal funds sold 
and securities purchased under 
REPO/total interest income 
RIAD4020/RIAD4107 
Other Other interest income/total interest 
income 
RIAD4518/RIAD4107 
Interest income HHI Interest income Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index 
((RIAD4010 + RIAD4065)/RIAD4107)
 2
 + 
(RIAD4115/RIAD4107)
 2
 + ((RIADB488 + RIADB489 + 
RIAD4060)/RIAD4107)
 2
 + (RIAD4069/RIAD4107)
 2
 + 
(RIAD4020/RIAD4107)
 2
 + (RIAD4518/RIAD4107)
 2
 
Interest Expense   
Deposits Interest expense on deposits/total 
interest expense 
(RIAD4508 + RIAD0093 + RIADA517 + RIADA518 + 
RIAD4172)/RIAD4073 
REPO Interest expense on federal funds 
purchased and securities sold under 
REPO/total interest expense 
RIAD4180/RIAD4073 
Trading liabilities & other 
borrowed money 
Interest expense on trading liabilities 
and other borrowed money/total interest 
expense 
RIAD4185/RIAD4073 
Subordinated notes Interest expense on subordinated notes 
and debentures/total interest expense 
RIAD4200/RIAD4073 
Interest expense HHI Interest expense Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index 
((RIAD4508 + RIAD0093 + RIADA517 + RIADA518 + 
RIAD4172)/RIAD4073)
 2
 + (RIAD4180/RIAD4073)
 2
 + 
(RIAD4185/RIAD4073)
 2
 + (RIAD4200/RIAD4073)
 2
 
 Note: Variables used in the analysis. Commercial bank data items are taken from Federal Reserve’s Reports of Condition and 
Income (Call Reports). 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table A2 Summary Statistics for All Sample Banks and Univariate Tests of Differences in 
Characteristics between Long-Time Securitizers and Non-Securitizers 
Variable All banks  Long-time securitizers
 
Non-securitizers Difference in means
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Abs % p-value 
Panel A: Balance sheet structure 
Total assets ($ 
billion) 
1.036 0.109 17.729 33.172 1.984 120.426 0.378 0.106 2.030 32.793 8666% 0.000 
Liquidity ratio 0.268 0.247 0.138 0.242 0.223 0.127 0.269 0.248 0.138 -0.027 -10% 0.006 
Trading asset ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  0.000 
Loan ratio 0.642 0.664 0.143 0.647 0.669 0.148 0.642 0.664 0.143 0.005 1% 0.683 
Loans/deposits 0.795 0.809 0.196 0.907 0.905 0.242 0.793 0.807 0.195 0.114 14% 0.000 
Deposit ratio 0.817 0.837 0.080 0.728 0.753 0.125 0.819 0.838 0.078 -0.091 -11% 0.000 
Capital ratio 0.114 0.101 0.043 0.107 0.093 0.044 0.114 0.101 0.043 -0.007 -6% 0.038 
Loan growth 0.149 0.081 0.233 0.100 0.087 0.097 0.150 0.081 0.235 -0.050 -33% 0.000 
Asset growth 0.123 0.075 0.158 0.099 0.085 0.085 0.124 0.074 0.159 -0.025 -20% 0.000 
Panel B: Loan portfolio 
Real estate loan ratio 0.659 0.687 0.191 0.603 0.667 0.272 0.660 0.687 0.189 -0.057 -9% 0.006 
Commercial and 
industrial loan ratio 
0.155 0.138 0.098 0.145 0.123 0.112 0.156 0.138 0.098 -0.010 -7% 0.231 
Agricultural loan ratio 0.070 0.008 0.121 0.021 0.001 0.056 0.071 0.008 0.121 -0.050 -70% 0.000 
Consumer loan ratio 0.093 0.068 0.090 0.146 0.081 0.160 0.092 0.068 0.088 0.054 59% 0.000 
Other loan ratio 0.015 0.006 0.027 0.037 0.016 0.049 0.015 0.006 0.027 0.022 149% 0.000 
Loan HHI 0.560 0.543 0.171 0.604 0.579 0.208 0.559 0.542 0.170 0.045 8% 0.004 
Panel C: Regulatory capital 
Tier 1 leverage ratio 0.111 0.096 0.046 0.097 0.084 0.042 0.111 0.096 0.046 -0.014 -13% 0.000 
Tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio 
0.167 0.139 0.085 0.131 0.113 0.056 0.168 0.139 0.085 -0.037 -22% 0.000 
Total risk-based 
capital ratio 
0.179 0.150 0.084 0.148 0.128 0.054 0.179 0.151 0.085 -0.032 -18% 0.000 
Panel D: Risk measures 
RWATA ratio 0.689 0.699 0.124 0.744 0.757 0.147 0.688 0.698 0.124 0.056 8% 0.000 
NPL ratio 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.002 20% 0.005 
Charge-off ratio 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006 193% 0.000 
Allowance ratio 0.014 0.013 0.006 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.006 0.003 21% 0.000 
Provision ratio 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.013 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 111% 0.000 
Time deposit 
premium 
0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 -1000% 0.057 
Panel E: Cost of funding 
Total liabilities 0.025 0.025 0.006 0.025 0.025 0.006 0.025 0.025 0.006 0.000 1% 0.528 
Total deposits 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.024 0.023 0.007 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.000 -2% 0.444 
Small time deposits 0.037 0.037 0.006 0.036 0.038 0.010 0.037 0.037 0.006 -0.002 -4% 0.047 
Large time deposits 0.037 0.037 0.006 0.037 0.037 0.007 0.037 0.037 0.006 0.000 0% 0.863 
Panel F: Operating performance 
Return on equity 0.087 0.091 0.076 0.125 0.118 0.068 0.087 0.090 0.076 0.039 45% 0.000 
Return on assets 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.004 49% 0.000 
Net interest margin 0.038 0.037 0.007 0.037 0.034 0.010 0.038 0.037 0.007 -0.001 -2% 0.245 
Cost/income 0.714 0.679 0.205 0.634 0.621 0.129 0.716 0.680 0.206 -0.081 -11% 0.000 
Revenue HHI 0.755 0.756 0.097 0.659 0.646 0.108 0.757 0.757 0.096 -0.098 -13% 0.000 
Non-interest income/ 
net operating 
revenue 
0.161 0.146 0.095 0.300 0.265 0.169 0.158 0.145 0.091 0.143 90% 0.000 
Panel G: Interest income 
Loans 0.792 0.820 0.129 0.790 0.820 0.145 0.792 0.820 0.129 -0.002 0% 0.861 
Depositary 
institutions 
0.008 0.002 0.017 0.006 0.001 0.012 0.008 0.002 0.017 -0.003 -32% 0.006 
Securities 0.170 0.144 0.122 0.168 0.145 0.129 0.170 0.144 0.122 -0.002 -1% 0.860 
Trading assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
REPO 0.022 0.014 0.025 0.015 0.007 0.024 0.023 0.015 0.025 -0.007 -32% 0.000 
Other 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 87% 0.000 
Interest income HHI 0.699 0.705 0.126 0.705 0.699 0.130 0.699 0.705 0.126 0.006 1% 0.554 
Panel H: Interest expense  
Deposits 0.902 0.939 0.112 0.768 0.772 0.165 0.904 0.940 0.109 -0.136 -15% 0.000 
REPO 0.019 0.005 0.036 0.054 0.025 0.065 0.018 0.004 0.035 0.036 201% 0.000 
Trading liabilities & 
other borrowed 
money 
0.077 0.040 0.096 0.157 0.129 0.129 0.075 0.039 0.094 0.082 109% 0.000 
Subordinated notes 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.013 0.000 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.012 1700% 0.000 
Interest expense HHI 0.852 0.890 0.141 0.701 0.669 0.180 0.855 0.893 0.139 -0.154 -18% 0.000 
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics for: (i) all sample banks (9183 banks); (ii) long-term-securitizers (179) (ever-securitizers excluding first-
time securitizers); and (iii) non-securitizers (8929). Mean, Med, and SD stand for the cross-sectional mean, median, and standard deviation values of 
the individual bank time series averages, accordingly. The last three columns report the comparison analysis of bank-specific characteristics between 
long-time securitizers and non-securitizers. Difference in means is calculated as the difference between long-time securitizers’ and non-securitizers’ 
means, in absolute (Abs) and percentage (%) values, with the p-values of the tests on the equality of means reported in the last column. 
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1 This misalignment stems from the fact that the incentive structure of securitization can create adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. Pennacchi (1988), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Duffee and Zhou 
(2001), Morrison (2005), and Parlour and Plantin (2008) posit a negative link. In contrast to much of the 
literature, Allen and Carletti (2006) suggest that credit risk transfer can be beneficial because it improves risk 
sharing. More recently, Chiesa (2008) finds that, if used properly, CRT does not necessarily weaken 
monitoring incentives and expands financial intermediation. 
2 Amongst other goals, the US’s Dodd-Frank Act now imposes constraints on US bank securitization activity. 
Improvements in the disclosure of details about securitizations is also one of the main aims of recent 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) amendments (FAS 166 and 167). Similar goals are also 
being pursued by European regulators (ECB 2011). 
3 Through the securitization channel, banks may also be able to diversify interest income and expense; 
increase liquidity; modify their loan portfolio in terms of both size and diversification; increase capital ratios; 
and use the capital released through securitization for expansion purposes (OCC 1997). 
4 Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) 
5 A comprehensive review of the literature on securitization can be found in Gorton and Metrick (2012). 
Tymoigne (2009a, b) provide a useful background on the securitization process. 
6 These methodological issues are not unique to estimating the effect of securitization. For example, Barba 
Navaretti and Castellani (2008) discuss similar issues in estimating the impact of foreign investment. 
7 In the context of securitization, a number of studies have applied the instrumental variables estimator, with 
bank size commonly used as an instrument for the securitization decision (e.g., Jiangli and Pritsker 2008). 
Other studies have attempted to control for the selection bias by applying the two-stage Heckman procedure 
(e.g., Panetta and Pozzolo 2010). However, potential issues are embedded in both approaches (for more 
detail, see Blundell and Dias 2000). 
8 Both matching on covariates and matching on the propensity score will make the conditional distribution of 
covariates in the treatment and control groups the same (Zhao 2004). The argument for matching on the 
propensity score is that it allows conditioning on a scalar variable rather than in a general n-space, thereby 
substantially reducing the dimensionality of the matching problem (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). 
9 Symbol  stands for orthogonality between two variables. 
10 Selection on observables is one of the three sources of bias identified by Heckman et al. (1998). The 
other two sources of bias are dealt with by the common support assumption discussed later in the section. 
11 As a general rule, economic theory can help in choosing the conditioning covariates to be included in X
on the basis of their role in the decision process (Imbens 2004). As noted by Smith and Todd (2005), the set 
of covariates that satisfies the matching conditions is not necessarily the most inclusive one. They suggest 
that augmenting a set that satisfies the identification conditions for matching could lead to a violation of those 
conditions; adding additional covariates may also intensify a common support problem. A number of papers 
find larger biases with cruder conditioning sets (Heckman et al. 1998, Lechner 2002). 
12 This is a non-parametric version of the widely used difference-in-differences estimator. 
13 By choosing and reweighting the observations in the region of common support, matching eliminates the 
other two of the three sources of bias identified by Heckman et al. (1998): the bias arising from the 
differences in the supports of X between the treated and control groups and the bias arising from the 
differences in the shapes of the distributions of X between the two groups in the common support region. 
Heckman et al. provide empirical evidence of the importance of imposing the common support condition in 
reducing bias and suggest that this constitutes the benefit of the non-parametric approach to econometrics. 
14 FFIEC (2000): www.ffiec.gov/press/pr110200.htm 
15 Winsorization consists of replacing the data below the N
th
 percentile with the N
th
, that is, a 1% 
winsorization implies replacing the data below 1
st
 percentile with the 1
st
 percentile data. 
16 Details on the construction of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
17 First-time securitizers might, on average, resemble non-securitizers more than would long-time 
securitizers. To check whether the cross-sectional analysis finds clearer distinctions, we also compare long-
time securitizers (that is, excluding first-time securitizers from the sample of securitizing banks) and non-
securitizers. The results are reported in Appendix 2. 
18 Calculated as the sum of the cross-sectional mean total assets of securitizing banks over the sum of the 
cross-sectional mean total assets of all sample banks. 
19 Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) using US bank holding company data find similar evidence. 
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20 Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) find that the net buyers of credit protection have dramatically more 
trading revenue than other banks. 
21 That is, the first securitization during the lifetime of a bank in the sample. 
22 For example, in year 2004, the 23 first-time securitizers are banks that do not securitize in 2001, 2002, 
2003 and securitize in 2004; the 7,774 non-securitizers are banks that do not securitize throughout the whole 
sample period, that is, from 2001 to 2008. 
23
 
Zhao (2008) provides evidence to suggest that, when the matching assumptions are satisfied, the choice 
of the estimator for the propensity score (probit, logit, or linear probability model) has little impact on the 
estimates of the average treatment effect. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest that logit and probit models 
might be preferable to the linear probability model; as for the choice of logit or probit, it is not critical for the 
binary treatment case because in this case the models usually yield similar outcomes. 
24 “Other loan ratio” is dropped from the probit model due to the multicollinearity. 
25 A few studies show that large banks are more likely to securitize because of the economies of scale 
enjoyed in underwriting and securitization, or because of the diseconomies of scale in deposit funding 
(Bannier and Hänsel 2008, Jiangli and Pritsker 2008). Loutskina (2011) notes that only large banks have a 
sufficient number of loans to access the securitization market independently of other financial intermediaries. 
26 We repeated this exercise using real gross state product and real gross state product per capita to test 
the robustness of our results to these alternative specifications. The results remain qualitatively consistent. 
27 There is a range of matching estimators available (e.g., nearest-neighbor, radius, kernel). All of these 
compare the outcome of the treated units with the outcome of the control units to determine the average 
treatment effect, but they differ in the way the neighborhood is defined and in the way the weights for the 
neighbors are constructed (Smith and Todd 2005). The choice among matching methods is accompanied by 
a trade-off in terms of efficiency and bias - using a single control unit for each treatment unit (nearest-
neighbor matching) ensures the smallest propensity score distance between the treatment and control units 
while using more control units (radius and kernel matching) increases the precision of the estimates, but at 
the cost of increased bias (Dehejia and Wahba 2002, Smith and Todd 2005). Dehejia and Wahba (2002) 
suggest that in general the choice of the estimator depends on the data in question; specifically, it depends 
on the degree of overlap between the treatment and control groups in terms of the propensity score. Having 
experimented with different versions, we find that the nearest-neighbor matching estimator performs best for 
our data. 
28 Bad matches might occur if the closest neighbor is far away in terms of the propensity score. Applying a 
caliper implies that a unit from the control group chosen as a match for a treated unit lies within the caliper 
(“propensity range”) and is closest in terms of the propensity score. In this case the matching quality rises; 
however, the variance of the estimates may increase if fewer matches can be performed as a result of 
excluding from the analysis the treated units with no matches found within the caliper (Smith and Todd 2005, 
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
29 To be able to conduct the three-year window analysis (that is, from t-1 to t+2, with the first securitization 
at time t), we had to impose a two-year post-securitization data requirement. This requirement does not 
apply to the 2007 first-time securitizers, as these banks are only included in the two-year window analysis 
(that is, from t-1 to t+1) because they do not have the t+2 data.  
30 The analysis is conducted using PSMATCH2 module for Stata developed by Sianesi and Leuven (2003). 
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Figure 1: Performance Trajectories 
 
  
Note: The graph illustrates theoretical trajectories of average performance for: (i) securitizers, i.e., banks that 
have undertaken at least one securitization transaction at the beginning of the observation period (at time t-
1); (ii) non-securitizers, i.e., banks that do not engage in securitization throughout the observation period 
(from t-1 to t+1); and (iii) first-time securitizers, i.e., banks that switch from being non-securitizers to being 
securitizers at time t by conducting their first securitization transaction. The first-time securitizers are 
presented by First-Time Securitizers A and First-Time Securitizers B, which are better and worse performers, 
respectively, compared to non-securitizers at time t-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Benchmark: 
Hypothetical trajectory 
of first-time securitizers 
had they not securitized 
Average 
Performance 
t+1 t-1 t 
Non-Securitizers 
First-Time Securitizers A 
First-Time Securitizers B 
Securitizers 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the Propensity Score of First-Time Securitizers and Non-
Securitizers before and after Matching 
  
Note: The graphs plot the propensity score distribution of the first-time securitizers and non-securitizers for 
the 2002-2007 period, before and after matching.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for All Sample Banks and Univariate Tests of Differences in 
Characteristics between Securitizers and Non-Securitizers 
Variable All banks Securitizers Non-securitizers Difference in means 
 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Abs % p-value 
Panel A: Balance sheet structure 
Total assets ($ 
billion) 
1.095 0.110 17.591 15.614 0.458 79.287 0.378 0.106 2.030 15.235 4026% 0.000 
Liquidity ratio 0.268 0.247 0.138 0.249 0.232 0.126 0.269 0.248 0.138 -0.020 -8% 0.001 
Trading asset ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  0.000 
Loan ratio 0.643 0.664 0.142 0.658 0.675 0.137 0.642 0.664 0.143 0.015 2% 0.025 
Loans/deposits 0.797 0.811 0.196 0.881 0.884 0.213 0.793 0.807 0.195 0.088 11% 0.000 
Deposit ratio 0.816 0.836 0.081 0.759 0.788 0.115 0.819 0.838 0.078 -0.060 -7% 0.000 
Capital ratio 0.114 0.100 0.043 0.106 0.095 0.039 0.114 0.101 0.043 -0.008 -7% 0.000 
Loan growth 0.149 0.082 0.232 0.122 0.097 0.138 0.150 0.081 0.235 -0.028 -19% 0.000 
Asset growth 0.123 0.075 0.157 0.116 0.091 0.109 0.124 0.074 0.159 -0.008 -7% 0.139 
Panel B: Loan portfolio 
Real estate loan ratio 0.659 0.687 0.191 0.643 0.689 0.238 0.660 0.687 0.189 -0.017 -3% 0.138 
Commercial and 
industrial loan ratio 
0.155 0.138 0.098 0.148 0.132 0.104 0.156 0.138 0.098 -0.007 -5% 0.146 
Agricultural loan ratio 0.069 0.007 0.120 0.038 0.002 0.078 0.071 0.008 0.121 -0.033 -46% 0.000 
Consumer loan ratio 0.093 0.068 0.091 0.112 0.069 0.131 0.092 0.068 0.088 0.020 22% 0.002 
Other loan ratio 0.015 0.006 0.028 0.029 0.011 0.044 0.015 0.006 0.027 0.014 95% 0.000 
Loan HHI 0.560 0.544 0.171 0.594 0.569 0.193 0.559 0.542 0.170 0.035 6% 0.000 
Panel C: Regulatory capital 
Tier 1 leverage ratio 0.111 0.095 0.045 0.098 0.087 0.039 0.111 0.096 0.046 -0.013 -12% 0.000 
Tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio 
0.167 0.138 0.084 0.136 0.117 0.056 0.168 0.139 0.085 -0.032 -19% 0.000 
Total risk-based 
capital ratio 
0.178 0.149 0.084 0.151 0.130 0.054 0.179 0.151 0.085 -0.029 -16% 0.000 
Panel D: Risk measures 
RWATA ratio 0.690 0.699 0.124 0.726 0.734 0.132 0.688 0.698 0.124 0.038 5% 0.000 
NPL ratio 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.001 7% 0.097 
Charge-off ratio 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 83% 0.000 
Allowance ratio 0.014 0.013 0.006 0.015 0.013 0.008 0.014 0.013 0.006 0.001 5% 0.088 
Provision ratio 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 48% 0.000 
Time deposit 
premium 
0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 600% 0.055 
Panel E: Cost of funding 
Total liabilities 0.025 0.025 0.006 0.025 0.025 0.006 0.025 0.025 0.006 0.001 2% 0.048 
Total deposits 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.000 -1% 0.686 
Small time deposits 0.037 0.037 0.006 0.036 0.038 0.008 0.037 0.037 0.006 -0.001 -2% 0.116 
Large time deposits 0.037 0.037 0.006 0.037 0.038 0.006 0.037 0.037 0.006 0.000 1% 0.479 
Panel F: Operating performance 
Return on equity 0.088 0.091 0.076 0.107 0.106 0.070 0.087 0.090 0.076 0.021 24% 0.000 
Return on assets 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.002 26% 0.000 
Net interest margin 0.037 0.037 0.007 0.036 0.035 0.008 0.038 0.037 0.007 -0.001 -3% 0.001 
Cost/income 0.714 0.678 0.204 0.667 0.647 0.151 0.716 0.680 0.206 -0.049 -7% 0.000 
Revenue HHI 0.754 0.755 0.097 0.693 0.690 0.106 0.757 0.757 0.096 -0.065 -9% 0.000 
Non-interest income/ 
net operating revenue 
0.162 0.147 0.096 0.245 0.205 0.152 0.158 0.145 0.091 0.087 55% 0.000 
Panel G: Interest income 
Loans 0.792 0.820 0.129 0.799 0.824 0.129 0.792 0.820 0.129 0.007 1% 0.292 
Depositary institutions 0.008 0.002 0.017 0.007 0.001 0.014 0.008 0.002 0.017 -0.002 -19% 0.028 
Securities 0.170 0.144 0.121 0.167 0.145 0.117 0.170 0.144 0.122 -0.003 -2% 0.581 
Trading assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
REPO 0.022 0.014 0.025 0.015 0.008 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.025 -0.007 -32% 0.000 
Other 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 58% 0.000 
Interest income HHI 0.700 0.705 0.126 0.707 0.706 0.126 0.699 0.705 0.126 0.008 1% 0.194 
Panel H: Interest expense  
Deposits 0.900 0.937 0.114 0.805 0.839 0.157 0.904 0.940 0.109 -0.100 -11% 0.000 
REPO 0.019 0.005 0.037 0.044 0.017 0.062 0.018 0.004 0.035 0.026 143% 0.000 
Trading liabilities & 
other borrowed 
money 
0.078 0.042 0.097 0.137 0.109 0.123 0.075 0.039 0.094 0.062 83% 0.000 
Subordinated notes 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.007 929% 0.000 
Interest expense HHI 0.849 0.888 0.142 0.738 0.740 0.171 0.855 0.893 0.139 -0.117 -14% 0.000 
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics for: (i) all sample banks (9182 banks); (ii) securitizers (432) (including first-time securitizers); and (iii) non-
securitizers (8750). Mean, Median, and SD stand for the cross-sectional mean, median, and standard deviation values of the individual bank time series 
averages, accordingly. The last three columns report the comparison analysis of bank-specific characteristics between securitizers and non-securitizers. 
Difference in means is calculated as the difference between securitizers’ and non-securitizers’ means, in absolute (Abs) and percentage (%) values, 
with the p-values of the tests on the equality of means reported in the last column. 
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Table 2: Statistics on the Number of First-Time Securitizers and Non-Securitizers 
 Panel A: Unmatched sample Panel B: Matched sample 
Year First-time 
securitizers 
Non-
securitizers 
Total First-time 
securitizers 
Non-
securitizers 
Total 
2002 30 7987 8017 23 23 46 
2003 40 7907 7947 36 36 72 
2004 23 7774 7797 21 21 42 
2005 36 7665 7701 25 25 50 
2006 25 7575 7600 23 23 46 
2007 43 7449 7492 40 40 80 
Total 197 46357 46554 168 168 336 
Note: The table reports the statistics on the number of first-time securitizers and non-securitizers. Panel A 
reports the statistics for the unmatched sample, i.e., first-time securitizers that conduct their first securitization 
in any year from 2002 to 2007 and their unmatched control group of non-securitizers. Panel B reports the 
statistics for the matched sample, i.e., first-time securitizers and their matches that have data for the pre- (i.e., 
t-1) and post-securitization (i.e., t+1 and t+2 for the 2002-2006 banks and t+1 for the 2007 banks) years and 
satisfy the common support condition. 
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Table 3: Statistics on the First Securitizations 
 Mortgage Home 
equity 
Credit card Auto Other 
consumer 
Commercial 
and 
industrial 
All other
Panel A: Number of transactions
Mortgage 135 0 0 1 2 3 2 
Home equity 0 6 0 0 1 1 0 
Credit card 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 
Auto 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Other 
consumer 
2 1 0 0 6 0 0 
Commercial 
and industrial 
3 1 0 0 0 22 3 
All other 2 0 0 0 0 3 27 
Only 127 4 11 2 3 15 22 
    
Panel B: Size of transactions (as of total assets)
Mean 0.0485 0.0282 0.0344 0.0744 0.0146 0.0717 0.0376 
SD 0.0871 0.0350 0.0986 0.1146 0.0181 0.1216 0.0466 
Min 0.0000 0.0015 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
Max 0.4230 0.0949 0.3300 0.2064 0.0470 0.4727 0.2331 
    
The table reports the statistics on the 197 first securitizations in the unmatched sample from 2002 to 2007 by the type of 
underlying assets, i.e.: (i) mortgages; (ii) home equity lines; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other 
consumer loans; (vi) commercial and industrial loans; and (viii) all other loans, all leases, and all other assets. Panel A 
reports the number of first securitizations across the asset types where row "Only" shows the number of transactions that 
include the respective asset type only. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics on the size of first securitizations relative 
to total assets, including the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Banks’ Propensity to Securitize 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error
Liquidity ratioit-1 0.127 0.439 
Loan ratioit-1 0.526 0.420 
Real estate loan ratioit-1 -0.634** 0.325 
Commercial and industrial loan ratioit-1 -0.797* 0.466 
Agricultural loan ratioit-1 -0.189 0.470 
Consumer loan ratioit-1 -0.507 0.502 
Loan HHIit-1 0.051 0.293 
Deposit ratioit-1 -0.772** 0.340 
Capital ratioit-1 0.007 1.189 
Sizeit-1 0.152*** 0.026 
Non-interest income/net operating revenueit-1 0.623** 0.255 
Cost of total liabilitiesit-1 5.802 5.051 
NPL ratioit-1 -4.102 2.949 
Return on equityit-1 -0.492 0.397 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratioit-1 -0.356 0.651 
Loan growthit-1 0.383*** 0.112 
Constant -2.887*** 0.903 
State dummies Yes  
Year dummies Yes  
Pseudo R
2
 0.093  
Log likelihood -1145.030  
Observations 44084  
Note: The table reports the probit regression estimates of banks’ propensity to 
securitize assets. The dependent variable equals to one for first-time securitizers and 
zero for non-securitizers. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Standard 
errors of estimated coefficients are clustered at the bank level. *, **, *** stand for 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: T-Test for Equality of Means of Covariates before and after Matching 
 Unmatched sample Matched sample 
Variable First-time 
securitizers 
Non-
securitizers
Difference 
in means 
First-time 
securitizers 
Non-
securitizers
Difference 
in means 
Liquidity ratioit-1 0.256 0.284 -0.028*** 0.256 0.250 0.006 
Loan ratioit-1 0.663 0.634 0.029*** 0.665 0.669 -0.004 
Real estate loan ratioit-1 0.661 0.647 0.014 0.679 0.693 -0.014 
Commercial and 
industrial loan ratioit-1 
0.152 0.154 -0.002 0.153 0.164 -0.011 
Agricultural loan ratioit-1 0.052 0.078 -0.026*** 0.060 0.051 0.009 
Consumer loan ratioit-1 0.088 0.100 -0.012* 0.082 0.072 0.010 
Loan HHIit-1 0.587 0.542 0.045*** 0.573 0.591 -0.018 
Deposit ratioit-1 0.785 0.828 -0.043*** 0.806 0.810 -0.004 
Capital ratioit-1 0.107 0.109 -0.002 0.102 0.107 -0.005 
Sizeit-1 12.581 11.603 0.978*** 12.416 12.425 -0.009 
Non-interest income/net 
operating revenueit-1 
0.200 0.161 0.039*** 0.189 0.183 0.006 
Cost of total liabilitiesit-1 0.024 0.023 0.001** 0.025 0.025 0.000 
NPL ratioit-1 0.008 0.010 -0.002** 0.007 0.008 -0.001 
Return on equityit-1 0.104 0.104 0.000 0.108 0.104 0.004 
Tier 1 risk-based capital 
ratioit-1 
0.149 0.164 -0.015** 0.142 0.147 -0.005 
Loan growthit-1 0.189 0.122 0.067*** 0.172 0.161 0.011 
Observations 197 45477 45674 168 168 336 
Note: The table reports the means of various bank-specific characteristics for the first-time securitizers and non-
securitizers, before and after matching. The difference in means is calculated as the difference between first-
time securitizers’ and non-securitizers’ means. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. The last row shows the number of first-time securitizers, non-securitizers, and the total 
number of observations in each sample. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Securitization on Bank Performance 
  Panel A: Two-year window Panel B: Three-year window 
  
  
First-time 
securitizers 
Non-
securitizers 
∆  
(t-stat) 
First-time 
securitizers 
Non-
securitizers 
∆  
(t-stat) 
Cost of funding         
Total liabilities -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0013 0.0016 -0.0003 
    (-0.09)   (-0.18) 
Total deposits -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0011 0.0015 -0.0003 
    (-0.08)   (-0.19) 
Credit risk         
NPL ratio 0.0030 0.0049 -0.0019 0.0006 0.0028 -0.0022 
    (-1.27)   (-1.56) 
Charge-off ratio 0.0008 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0011 
    (0.17)   (-1.57) 
Profitability         
Return on equity -0.0188 -0.0165 -0.0022 -0.0177 -0.0139 -0.0038 
    (-0.27)   (-0.45) 
Return on assets -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0000 
    (-0.21)   (0.02) 
Interest income and 
expense structure 
        
Interest income HHI 0.0090 0.0171 -0.0082 0.0117 0.0167 -0.0049 
     (-1.02)   (-0.41) 
Interest expense HHI -0.0126 -0.0231 0.0104 -0.0220 -0.0268 0.0048 
     (1.03)   (0.35) 
Liquidity         
Liquidity ratio -0.0117 -0.0099 -0.0018 -0.0201 -0.0151 -0.0049 
    (-0.26)   (-0.47) 
Loans/deposits 0.0264 0.0363 -0.0098 0.0439 0.0449 -0.0011 
    (-0.90)   (-0.07) 
Loan portfolio         
Loan ratio 0.0142 0.0179 -0.0037 0.0217 0.0238 -0.0021 
    (-0.49)   (-0.20) 
Loan HHI 0.0123 0.0199 -0.0076 0.0208 0.0345 -0.0137 
    (-1.14)   (-1.45) 
Capital         
Capital ratio -0.0002 -0.0025 0.0023 0.0027 -0.0009 0.0037 
    (0.73)   (0.99) 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio -0.0098 -0.0076 -0.0022 -0.0100 -0.0049 -0.0050 
    (-0.41)   (-0.83) 
Growth         
Loan growth -0.0772 -0.0678 -0.0093 -0.0645 -0.0492 -0.0153 
     (-0.31)   (-0.47) 
Asset growth -0.0612 -0.0577 -0.0035 -0.0561 -0.0457 -0.0105 
     (-0.15)   (-0.44) 
Observations   168 168 336 128 128 256 
Note: The table reports the propensity score matching estimates of the average treatment effect of securitization on performance of the 
first-time securitizers. The average treatment effect of securitization on a performance indicator (∆) is estimated as the difference 
between the first-time securitizers’ mean change in the performance indicator (column “First-time securitizers”) and that of matched non-
securitizers (column “Non-securitizers”), over a two-year window (Panel A) and a three-year window (Panel B). T-statistics based on 
bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The last row reports the number of first-time securitizers, non-securitizers, and the total number of observations for each 
estimation. 
57 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Robustness Tests: Alternative Performance Measures  
  Panel A: Two-year window Panel B: Three-year window 
  
  
First-time 
securitizers 
Non-
securitizers 
∆  
(t-stat) 
First-time 
securitizers 
Non-
securitizers 
∆ 
(t-stat) 
Cost of funding         
Small time deposits -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0003 
     (0.07)   (-0.14) 
Large time deposits -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0017 -0.0001 
    (-0.13)   (-0.06) 
Credit risk         
Provision ratio 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0012 
    (-0.56)   (-1.42) 
Time deposit premium -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0014 0.0015 -0.0001 
     (-0.81)   (-0.07) 
Profitability         
Net interest margin -0.0013 -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0006 
    (0.03)   (-0.90) 
Cost/income 0.0066 0.0064 0.0002 0.0069 0.0060 0.0008 
    (0.01)   (0.05) 
Non-interest income/net operating 
revenue 0.0034 -0.0088 0.0123 0.0018 -0.0081 0.0098 
     (1.48)   (1.04) 
Interest income structure         
Loans 0.0114 0.0120 -0.0006 0.0140 0.0132 0.0007 
    (-0.08)   (0.08) 
Depositary institutions 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0004 
    (0.26)   (-0.28) 
Securities -0.0070 -0.0052 -0.0018 -0.0167 -0.0103 -0.0064 
    (-0.27)   (-0.77) 
Trading assets 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 
    (-0.49)   (0.47) 
REPO -0.0028 -0.0056 0.0028 0.0001 -0.0009 0.0010 
    (1.32)   (0.37) 
Other -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0008 
    (-0.53)   (1.04) 
Interest expense structure         
Deposits -0.0063 -0.0172 0.0108 -0.0104 -0.0170 0.0066 
    (1.42)   (0.59) 
REPO 0.0019 0.0037 -0.0018 0.0111 0.0097 0.0014 
    (-0.45)   (0.27) 
Trading liabilities & other borrowed 
money 
0.0031 0.0120 -0.0089 -0.0017 0.0070 -0.0087 
    (-1.19)   (-0.77) 
Subordinated notes 0.0009 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 
    (0.67)   (0.27) 
Loan portfolio         
Real estate loan ratio 0.0202 0.0203 -0.0001 0.0325 0.0321 0.0004 
    (-0.01)   (0.05) 
Commercial and industrial loan ratio -0.0003 -0.0104 0.0101 -0.0033 -0.0153 0.0120 
    (1.58)   (1.47) 
Agricultural loan ratio -0.0040 -0.0009 -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0017 -0.0017 
    (-1.25)   (-0.54) 
Consumer loan ratio -0.0143 -0.0081 -0.0062** -0.0225 -0.0167 -0.0058 
    (-1.97)   (-1.16) 
Other loan ratio 0.0005 -0.0009 0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0002 
     (0.62)   (0.07) 
Capital         
Tier 1 leverage ratio -0.0026 -0.0042 0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0002 
    (0.47)   (-0.04) 
Total risk-based capital ratio -0.0097 -0.0075 -0.0022 -0.0101 -0.0050 -0.0051 
     (-0.45)   (-0.90) 
Observations   168 168 336 128 128 256 
Note: The table presents the robustness tests for the average treatment effect of securitization on performance of the first-time 
securitizers using alternative performance measures. The average treatment effect of securitization on a performance indicator (∆) is 
estimated as the difference between the first-time securitizers’ mean change in the performance indicator (column “First-time 
securitizers”) and that of matched non-securitizers (column “Non-securitizers”), over a two-year window (Panel A) and a three-year 
window (Panel B). T-statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The last row reports the number of first-time securitizers, non-securitizers, and 
the total number of observations for each estimation. 
 
 
